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AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO

AGDA (M) (28 Jan 70) FOR OT UT 694293

2 February 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 507th
Transportation Group, Period Ending 31 October 1969

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

1 Incl
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HQ, 507TH TRANSPORTATION GROUP (MOVEMENT CONTROL)
APO 96309

AVGI-SP

15 November 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of 507th Transportation Group (Movement Control) for Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

Commanding General
United States Army, Vietnam
ATTN: AVHGC-DST
APO 96375

1. Operations: Significant Activities. The 507th Transportation Group (Movement Control) is designated Traffic Management Agency, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. During the period of this report (1 August-31 October 1969) Traffic Management Agency (TMA) continued its mission of transportation movement control and the management of the MACV Common Service/User Transportation System in the Republic of Vietnam with primary emphasis being placed on the following aspects:

a. PASSENGER AND CARGO MOVEMENTS:

	<u>AIR</u>	<u>WATER</u>	<u>RAIL</u>	<u>*HIGHWAY</u>	
	<u>NR PAX</u>	<u>CARGO STON</u>	<u>CARGO STON</u>	<u>CARGO STON</u>	
AUG	368,720	59,167.7	992,379	58,903	10,872
SEP	337,808	61,685.0	985,484	60,916	7,312
OCT	362,642	64,685.1	848,955	83,128	7,605

*Includes only TMA-controlled movement to, within and from the Delta.

b. INTERNAL ORGANIZATION OF TMA: No change.

c. STATUS OF PERSONNEL:

(1) STRENGTHS:

	<u>ARMY</u> <u>OFF/EM</u>	<u>NAVY</u> <u>OFF/EM</u>	<u>AIR FORCE</u> <u>OFF/EM</u>	<u>MARINE</u> <u>OFF/EM</u>	<u>LN</u> <u>CIV</u>
AUG	74/284	3/10	7/22	2/0	70
SEP	70/303	3/10	7/22	2/0	70
OCT	70/312	3/10	7/21	2/0	68

(2) CASUALTIES: 0

(3) EVACUATIONS: 7 (Medical, non-combat)

(4) AWARDS/DECORATIONS:

(a) Legion of Merit: 1 (1st Oak Leaf Cluster)

(b) Bronze Star: 27 (3 1st Oak Leaf Cluster)

(c) Joint Service Commendation Medal: 34

(d) Army Commendation Medal: 37

(e) Air Force Commendation Medal: 1

(f) MACV Certificate of Achievement: 5

d. EXPANSION OF OPERATIONS:

(1) KEYSTONE EAGLE: President Nixon announced in June 1969 that 25,000 US troops would be withdrawn from Vietnam and that those troops would be replaced by the steadily improving Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF). The redeployment/replacement, nicknamed KEYSTONE EAGLE, began on 8 July 1969 and extended through 31 August 1969. TMA-MACV was tasked with the traffic management responsibilities in the MACV area. Following is a categorization of the KEYSTONE EAGLE movement of passengers and cargo by air and sea:

(a) <u>AIR</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
(1) Passengers	18,817
(2) Cargo STON	112.7
(b) <u>SEA</u>	
(1) Passengers	6,323
(2) Cargo STON	15,352.4
(c) <u>TOTAL LIFT:</u>	
(1) Passengers	25,140
(2) Cargo STON	15,465.1

(2) **KEYSTONE CARDINAL:** President Nixon announced on 16 September 1969 that the number of US troops authorizations in Vietnam would be reduced by 40,500 by 15 December 1969 and that these troops would be replaced by the steadily improving Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF). The redeployment, nicknamed **KEYSTONE CARDINAL**, began on 21 September 1969. As in the **KEYSTONE EAGLE** redeployment of 25,000 US troops during July and August 1969, TMA-MACV was tasked with the traffic management responsibilities in the MACV area. TMA coordinated the efforts of the MACV Service Components and developed the flow plan which served as the basis for the CINCPAC **KEYSTONE CARDINAL** Movement Program. After publication of the CINCPAC document, TMA then developed and published the in-country movement program to support the CINCPAC program and ancillary movements resulting from **KEYSTONE CARDINAL**.

e. **NORMAL OPERATIONS:** Throughout the reporting period the 507th Transportation Group (Movement Control) carried on normal operations except as noted above.

2. **Lessons Learned:** Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations:

- a. **PERSONNEL:** None.
- b. **INTELLIGENCE:** None.
- c. **OPERATIONS:** See Inclosures.
- d. **ORGANIZATION:** None.
- e. **TRAINING:** None.
- f. **LOGISTICS:** See para 2c above.
- g. **COMMUNICATIONS:** None.
- h. **MATERIEL:** None.
- i. **OTHER:** None.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



C. C. RHODES
Major, USA
Adjutant

4 Incl

- 1. Annex A, AIRLIFT
- 2. Annex B, LAND MOVEMENTS
- 3. Annex C, SEALIFT
- 4. Annex D, GENERAL

AVHOC-DST (15 Nov 69) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of 507th Transportation Group
(Movement Control) for Period Ending 31 October 1969, RGS CSFOR-65
(R2) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 24 DEC 1969

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOF-DT,
APO 96358

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1969 from Headquarters, 507th Transportation Group (Movement Control).

2. Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning "Airfield Classification Survey Teams", ANNEX A, page 1, paragraph 1; concur. USARV will bring the recommendation to the attention of the Joint Air Operations Group for consideration. However, the establishment of a joint team will not alter the prerogative of the using agency to restrict the use of an airfield to their aircraft based upon their established criteria.

b. Reference item concerning "Airfield Closures", ANNEX A, page 1, paragraph 2; concur. The Memorandum of Agreement on Airfield Maintenance, dated 1 Jul 69, between the Government of Vietnam Public Works, Communications, and Transportation Ministry and the Military Assistance Command Vietnam states that prior notification of and coordination with the Director of Airbases, RVN thru MACDO-BD is required.

c. Reference item concerning "Rail Security", ANNEX B, paragraph 2; concur. Currently the Vietnamese Military Railway Security (MRS) Battalion provides limited railway security in the Qui Nhon area. USAID En/Rail Advisor, MACV-TMA (Land) and HQ USARV, G4 Services (Land) have recommended to the VN Central Railway Security Board for the transfer of railway and cargo security responsibilities to the 2d MRS Bn. The Joint General Staff (J-3) is studying the recommendation.

3. The 507th Transportation Group is the carrier unit for the Traffic Management Agency (TMA). TMA is under the staff cognizance of the MACV J4. The comments pertaining to operations and logistics recorded in Inclosures 1 through 4 of the report are identified for consideration by MACV J45.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


A. GOODWIN

Adjutant General

Cy furn:
507th Trans Gp
MACV J45

GPOP-DT (15 Nov 69) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 507th Transportation Group (Movement Control) for Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 15 JAN 70

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:


B. A. TUCKER
CPT. AGC
ASST AG

ANNEX A (AIRLIFT)

1. Airfield Classification Survey Teams.

OBSERVATION: Many airfields in the Mekong Delta area are steadily deteriorating. Several airfields formerly classed as C-123 airfields have been downgraded to C-7A class.

EVALUATION: Estimates as to airfield serviceability are being made by more than one organization/agency, resulting in doubt as to actual airfield status. For instance, US Army Engineers evaluate an airfield as satisfactory, and a US Air Force team evaluates the same airfield as unsafe.

RECOMMENDATION: Recommend that a joint team consisting of both US Army and US Air Force personnel be established as the central authority for classifying airfield serviceability.

2. Airfield Closures.

OBSERVATION: During this reporting period, the Qui Nhon Army airfield was closed for runway and ramp repair for over two months. All cargo and passengers were diverted to Phu Cat air base, approximately 30 miles away.

EVALUATION: When an airfield such as Qui Nhon is closed, different commands and services and many headquarters are involved. Due to this diversity of involvement, it is difficult for all necessary coordination to be accomplished.

RECOMMENDATION: That joint level headquarters elements take early and strong action to coordinate independently-oriented service component actions.

3. Perishable Ration Resupply.

OBSERVATION: Aircraft in Vietnam do not always run on a firm schedule. Resupply Special Mission Airlift Requests (SMAR's) are set-up on a cargo show time. When perishable rations are being transported, it is not always desirable to bring them into the aerial port based on the cargo show time. If the aircraft is late, the rations will spoil.

EVALUATION: In order to prevent spoilage of perishable rations, a practice has been instituted in some areas whereby the TMA cargo Air Traffic Coordinating Office (ATCO) coordinates with the local 834th Air Division Airlift Control Element (ALCE) as to the firm arrival time of the aircraft. Rations are not called forward until 30 minutes before the aircraft is due on the ground.

RECOMMENDATION: Recommend that the above stated practice be continued and be adopted universally wherever conditions permit.

4. Dedicated Airlift Assets.

OBSERVATION: Although our experience in providing in-country airlift has shown that 50% more productivity can be obtained from assigning airframes to

Common Service Airlift System (CSAS) use vice dedicated service, there is always a requirement for some dedicated assets to support field activities. The keynote is short-fuze responsiveness and not productivity.

EVALUATION: We have learned that dedicated airlift is necessary, but that it must be closely monitored to insure that the dedicated service does not compete with CSAS and cause forecasts of CSAS requirements to be unrealistic.

RECOMMENDATION: Recommend establishment of a dedicated airlift assignment review panel to periodically review and evaluate the need for and the performance of dedicated airframes.

5. Combat Essential Airlift Movements and Routine Resupply SMARs.

OBSERVATION: Units have requested Combat Essential (CE) Missions to destinations serviced by routine resupply SMARs and, in effect, are placing essential cargo in a competitive situation.

EVALUATION: Units requesting Combat Essential Missions often have a routine resupply SMAR in effect with the same origin, destination and type cargo. Requirements for routine resupply SMARs are placed 24 hours in advance and technically represent that unit's forecasted requirements for the next 24-hour period. Combat essential requirements are technically needed within eight hours. It has been observed that a unit with a valid resupply SMAR in effect with a fragged mission for movement will request a Combat Essential Mission for the same type of cargo going to the same destination. Combat Essential Missions then take precedence and missions fragged to move the SMAR cargo are often diverted to move the CE requirement. This creates an unnecessary backlog in the aerial port and sometimes results in the unit requesting another CE to move the SMAR cargo backlogged in port.

RECOMMENDATION: Recommend that units be required to cancel their routine resupply SMAR requests for cargo of the same supply class going to the same destination on the day a CE is requested for movement and that weight required for routine resupply SMAR be added to total requirement for CE.

6. Spoilage of Milk Resulting from Delays due to Weather or Maintenance.

OBSERVATION: Milk is palletized on 463L pallets. High temperature and high susceptibility to spoilage of milk made it difficult to control the condition of the milk after it was palletized for loading. The width of the 463L pallets prohibited putting them into cold storage vans. Local aerial port personnel monitored the condition of the milk and returned the commodity to cold storage vans when such action appeared necessary. However, at times, there were delays in disassembling the pallets and returning the milk to refrigerator storage resulting in spoilage.

EVALUATION: New procedures were implemented on 27 October 1969 as follows:

a. TMA authorized automatic return of milk to cold storage when the following conditions exist:

(1) Milk temperature rises to 50 degrees fahrenheit.

(2) No airlift is available for one hour or more.

b. Aerial port personnel monitor the milk temperature, load and unload pallets and vans.

c. The support commands provide cold storage facilities at the aerial ports. For example, at Danang, the Naval Support Activity provides cold storage vans (reefer) at the aerial port.

RECOMMENDATION: Recommend that this procedure be continued where practiced and adopted at all stations where milk spoilage occurs.

7. Marine Out-of-Country Airlift Requests.

OBSERVATION: Fleet Marine Force Pacific (FMFPAC) extended an order for III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF) to submit their requests for out-of-country air transport through FMFPAC channels.

EVALUATION: This method resulted in III MAF's experiencing a considerable amount of frustration because confirmation of the request would be forwarded only hours before block time (available time). The request would further be complicated when changes were made in the interim. To alleviate this situation TMA-MACV strongly suggested that III MAF obtain permission to submit their requests through TMA channels to Western Pacific Transportation Office (WTO). This was done and to this date all airlift requests have been submitted and completed without further incident.

RECOMMENDATION: Recommend that requests for out-of-country air transport continue to be submitted through TMA channels to WTO.

ANNEX C (SEALIFT)

1. Overstated Rock Movement Forecast

OBSERVATION: The monthly forecast of rock movement in the Delta Transportation Plan (Delta Rock Program) is often set too high due to unrealistic considerations of material handling equipment (MHE) availability.

EVALUATION: The rock forecast is steadily increasing based on requirements, mode available and port discharge capability. The tonnage of rock moved is directly dependent upon the availability of cranes to discharge rock on a consistent basis. Equipment breakdowns are often encountered and limit the amount of rock discharged.

RECOMMENDATION: Recommend that forecasters give ample consideration to equipment status, especially equipment deadline reports, when rock forecasts are made.

2. Shortage of LCM/LCU Assets in The Delta (Reference MACV Directive 55-4)

OBSERVATION: Landing craft (LCM/LCU) assets are becoming increasingly scarce in the Mekong Delta.

EVALUATION: This type asset is highly desirable for Delta cargo deliveries due to the large network of accessible waterways. From an economic viewpoint LCU/LCM transport is highly desirable for delivery of quantities of PSP, construction materials and general cargo. There are several areas in the Delta that can be reached only via water-borne transport. Cargo movement requirements exceed the movement capability of water transportation assets presently available in the Delta.

RECOMMENDATION: Recommend that consideration be given to assignment of additional landing craft (LCU/LCM) for the movement of routine cargo in the Delta.

ANNEX D (GENERAL)

1. MACV Automated Movements Management System (MACAMMS)

OBSERVATION: MACAMMS is the first attempt in a combat theater to automate the movement management functions. The system receives daily shipment requirements from the TMA offices, processes the data at the MACV central computer (IBM 360/50 I), and the output is returned on daily scheduled passenger flights. The system is designed to support the centralized management required by TMA and the regional management required by the shipper. However, due to the wide geographical separation of TMA field offices (Dong Ha to Soc Trang), the conversion to punch cards at each regional office and communication of the data to the central computer is substandard.

EVALUATION: TMA regional offices must borrow keypunch time to prepare the input cards. The equipment time is borrowed from local personnel centers, supply activities or any other organizations that will allow a stranger to use their equipment. This requires the loss of a TMA man and vehicle for up to two hours, and requires the cut-off time for the data to be pushed back. The output is in print-out form and is loaded aboard passenger aircraft at Tan Son Nhut each morning. The arrival time at the Traffic Regions is then as late as 1400 hours, thus giving the field traffic manager very little assistance.

RECOMMENDATION: If MACAMMS is to assist the field office traffic manager as much as it currently assists the central headquarters, keypunch equipment and devices to print the output must be made available at each field office. Any device from an on-line piece of equipment (i.e. IBM 1050) to a free standing document writing system using common service AUTODIN communications (i.e. IBM 870) would satisfy both the requirements for submitting and receiving MACAMMS. Recommend that this equipment be acquired and installed.

2. Movement of Telephone Poles.

OBSERVATION: There are frequent requirements to move telephone poles to various locations in III Corps Tactical Zone. These poles often exceed the maximum length which can be moved on a normal stake and platform (S&P) trailer.

EVALUATION: Difficulty has been experienced in the movement of telephone poles within the III Corps Tactical Zone. These poles generally exceed 50 feet in length and are not compatible for movement on an S&P trailer. The US Military does not have a contract with any commercial contractor equipped with pole trailers. All pole trailers available are assigned to signal units in the Long Binh area and availability of these trailers for movement of telephone poles in the common service transportation system is minimal. These pole trailers are totally assigned as dedicated assets. Requirements to move telephone poles are intermittent and sites to which these poles are to be moved are usually inaccessible by water. The only other feasible mode is air. There are no helicopter assets available in the Common Service Airlift System. Annex O, MACV Directive 55-4, lists the procedures by which units may request helicopter assets for movement of cargo. This system is ineffective because

TMA-MACV has no point of contact for requesting helicopter assets. It is also a very uneconomical mode of transportation for telephone poles. This mode has necessarily been used due to the non-availability of an alternate, more desirable mode.

RECOMMENDATION: Recommend that a concerted effort be made to initiate negotiations with qualified commercial contractors to satisfy specific requirements for movement of telephone poles by highway to those points accessible by highway. Further, recommend that a workable arrangement be made whereby a point of contact would be established for placing requirements for helicopter lifts.

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